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ABSTRACT 
For decades, the European legislators and the Court of Justice have extended the rights to free 
movement and cross-border welfare in the European Union (EU). Strong assumptions on the impact 
of these rules have been posed, by some held to lead to welfare migration and thus to be a 
fundamental challenge to the welfare state. However, studies of how these rules are implemented 
and what become the de-facto outcomes hereof remain scarce. We address this research gap, by 
examining domestic responses to and outcomes of dynamic EU rules. Based on a unique set of 
administrative data, we do so for all EU citizens residing in the universalistic, tax-financed welfare 
state of Denmark between 2002-2013. We find that domestic responses have been restrictive and 
outcomes limited.  
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Introduction 
The legislation of the European Union (EU) grants EU citizens a right to move and reside freely 
within the Union and a right to access welfare across borders. These rules and rights have long been 
contested and their impact on the welfare state discussed (Kvist 2004; Hemerijck 2013; Blauberger 
and Schmidt 2014; Ferrera 2005, 2017; Anderson 2015; Conant 2002; Verschueren 2012, 2015). 
Recently the political salience of these rules and rights stood out most clearly in the British debate 
on EU membership. EU citizens on the British labour market – and their rights to welfare benefits– 
resulted in a heated, polarised debate and the UK voted Leave (Reenen 2016; Geddes and Hadj-
Abdou 2016). Also in the scholarly literature, the relationship between free movement of people 
and the welfare state is critically discussed. Research on welfare migration suggests the welfare 
state to be highly challenged by free movement as migrants from lower income countries will be 
attracted by richer and more generous welfare states (Giulietti and Wahba 2012). A hypothesis of 
welfare magnetism has been formulated, according to which migrants will cluster in states with 
high benefits (Borjas 1999), thus making more inclusive welfare states vulnerable in a Union where 
people can move freely.  
 
The public debate and research on EU free movement of people contribute to the fostering of an 
image of the welfare state undergoing rather fundamental change. However, conclusions are 
reached without much examinination of subsequent domestic responses to and outcomes of EU 
rules. In this paper, we address this research gap in order to account for the dynamic scope and 
impact of EU rules when implemented on the ground (Versluis 2007). We first analyse the dynamic 
development of EU rules and rights, gradually extending the rights of EU citizens to welfare 
benefits in other Member States traditionally reserved for own citizens or long term residents. In 
particular, the CJEU has been a key player, first pushing for EU citizens’ more immediate access to 
the welfare systems of a hosting Member State on basis of Union citizenship as established in the 
Treaty but, however, later turning to more restrictive rulings on basis of secondary legislation 
(Caporaso and Tarrow 2009; Dougan 2013). We then turn to analysing the impact at the national 
level of these dynamic rules and rights. We take Denmark as our welfare state case. As detailed in 
the section on case selection below, Denmark constitutes a crucial case for examining such impact. 
Within Denmark, we analyse domestic responses and outcomes of EU rules and rights for four 
welfare benefits of which three are non-contributory: study grants, child benefits and social 
assistance and one is contributory: unemployment benefits. We examine responses and outcomes 
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for a long time span, i.e. between 2002 to the the end of 2013. This 12 years’ time span covers a 
period of essential structural change in European integration. During these years, the EU 
experienced its grand enlargements, which implied a considerable increase in socio-economic 
differences across the Union. Moreover, the period covers important changes in legal and political 
integration as it includes the post-2008 financial and economic crises. Furthermore, after the 
enlargements Member States could choose to restrict free movement for a period of up to seven 
years. The Danish transitional period ended May 2009 and the time span thus includes the post-
transitional period. Finally, whereas political integration had conditioned the right to equal 
treatment for study grants and social assistance on five years’ residence in the host Member State, 
legal integration made it possible to access these benefits more immediately. Thus the changes 
occurring in this period increases the likelihood of welfare migration, in particular to a welfare state 
as Denmark. To examine the welfare migration assumption, we question: Are EU citizens 
increasingly and more immidiatedly granted Danish welfare benefits during years of structural 
change, and why or why not?    
 
The article is structured as follows. Below, we present Denmark as our case selected and the data 
for our analysis. We then present the theoretical assumptions on welfare migration and dynamic EU 
rules as challenges to the welfare state. However, we add scholarly views on why domestic 
responses should be taken into account in order to understand and explain the impact of dynamic 
rules and rights. Subsequently, we analyse the domestic responses to EU rules in the welfare state of 
Denmark. We then examine the outcomes of EU rules, measured as EU citizens’ de facto use of the 
four welfare benefits in Denmark between 2002-2013. Finally, we conclude on the findings and 
explanations for why EU rules did not impact as public and scholarly assumptions have otherwise 
posed.  
 
Case selection and data  
We examine responses and outcomes to EU rules in the Danish welfare state. The Danish welfare 
state is often presented as distinct. First, the Danish welfare state has traditionally been 
characterised as universalist, promoting equality of status among its citizens. Social policies are not 
targeted at low income groups, as in the residual welfare state but go to the middleclass as to the 
poor. Second, social rights are granted on the basis of residence (Cornelissen 1997, 32). A person is 
entitled to welfare because s/he has legal residence, and not as a result of social contributions or 
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citizenship. Third, benefits have traditionally been tax-financed and not based on contributions. 
Social security is not dependent on labour market participation, as in the insurance-based welfare 
state (Korpi and Palme 1998). However, tax payment is not a direct requirement to receive a 
specific social benefit. Due to these characteristics, the Danish welfare state has been regarded as 
more unfit for the rationales of EU cross-border welfare, in particular because residents can access 
welfare without necessarily contributing to its financing.  
 
We research outcomes for four main welfare benefits: study grants, child benefits, social assistance 
and unemployment benefits. EU political and legal integration makes it possible that these benefits, 
traditionally reserved to national citizens or long term residents, become more immediately 
accessible for EU citizens. All benefits should be attractive according to a welfare migration 
argument as they are relatively generous. Furthermore, three of the benefits are tax-financed and 
non-contributory. A Danish study grant is approximately 800 euro per month (2017 level). This is a 
universal benefit granted to all students regardless of their parents’ income. Additionally, students 
can take loans. Families with children between 0-18 years old in Denmark are entitled to child care 
allowance. The benefit is universal and again granted independently of income. The amount paid 
depends on the age of the child. On average it amounts to approximately 160 euro per month per 
child (2017 level). A Danish social assistance benefit is approximately 1450 euro per month (2017 
level). Social assistance is a tax-financed minimum subsistence  benefit granted to the unemployed 
who does not qualify for the higher contribution-dependent unemployment benefits and does not 
have means of his/her own. The Danish unemployment benefit is insurance-based. Entitlement to 
unemployment benefits depends on membership of and contributions to an unemployment 
insurance fund for at least one year. The amount paid can be up to a maximum of 90% of the 
member's previous work income, but no more than a maximum rate of approximately 2300 euro per 
month (2017 level).   
  
We examine different types of domestic responses: judicial, political and administrative. Judicial 
responses cover domestic legal proceedings interpreting the specific EU rules and rights as they 
take place when national court rulings or quasi judicial proceedings consider EU law in relation to 
domestic policies and law. Political and administrative responses concern the domestic ex post 
interpretations of specific EU rules and rights. Domestic responses to EU rules may take two forms: 
receptive, i.e., applying EU rules, or defensive, i.e., aiming to protect the status quo of national 
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institutions. For the analysis of domestic responses, different data have been collected. Judicial 
responses are analysed by means of national court cases and quasi-judicial administrative decisions 
from January 2002 to June 2017. Political and administrative responses are examined by means of 
qualitative interviews with key respondents as well as examination of official and unofficial 
documents. A total of 15 interviews has been carried out in the period from September 2015 to June 
2017 with altogether 9 respondents from the State Department, the Danish Immigration Service, 
Danish Agency for Institutions and Educational Grants, Ministry of Employment, The Danish 
Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment and municipal offices administrating social assistance 
in four different Danish municipalities varying upon population size, geography and political 
leadership. Our empirics on domestic responses thus go as much forward in time as possible and 
thus allow for updated insights on how EU rules are received on the ground. 
 
Outcomes are investigated through the development of EU citizens’ actual consumption of the four  
benefits. For this part of the analysis, we have compiled Danish register data which is a unique 
source of administrative data as much forward in time as data availability has allowed us, i.e. from 
January 2002 to the end of 2013. Our dataset includes repeated cross sections of the total population 
of EU citizens residing in Denmark on December 31st of each year between 2002 and 2013. We 
then examine the consumption of social benefits in the current year. We construct a dataset for each 
year by merging a host of administrative registers with the total population of EU citizens residing 
in Denmark. These administrative data contain information on each individual’s total annual 
consumption of social benefits. Danish register data are highly reliable sources of individual 
information directly reported from the tax agency and local authorities to Statistics Denmark. 
However, gaining access to the full population is seldom granted and has, to our knowledge, never 
been compiled for Denmark or other countries. Thus, this unique dataset enables us to examine the 
evolution of EU citizens’ consumption of the selected benefits over a long period of time. We use 
population and migration administrative register information to measure the length of residence in 
Denmark that the EU citizen had up to the 31
st
 of December of each year. By taking the length of 
residence into account, we examine the more immediate access to these benefits, i.e. the extent to 
which the benefits are granted after a short residence, which is defined as up to one year or depend 
on a certain degree on social integration, i.e., a longer period of residence.  
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Welfare migration, dynamic rules and domestic responses  
Theoretically, the welfare migration hypothesis states that migrants are more likely to move to 
countries with generous welfare systems (Giulietti and Wahba 2012). Examining immigrants’ 
residential choices on their arrival in the US, Borjas argued to have identified a ‘welfare magnet’ 
mechanism, where immigrants move to states with more attractive welfare schemes (Borjas 1999). 
The hypothesis thus perceives the migrant as rationally motivated by welfare, choosing one state 
over another in order to maximize benefits (Peterson and Rom 1989; Schram, Nitz, and Krueger 
1998). The ‘welfare magnetism’ scenario also assumes that if welfare-motivated behaviour unfolds, 
states have limited capacity to respond to and control for the negative outcomes hereof. In 
particular, there are constitutional limits to political actions, as for example when US states adopted 
residence requirements upon social assistance  and the US Supreme Court in 1999 in the case Saenz 
v Row found that such welfare residence restrictions infringed the constitutional right to travel 
(Allard and Danziger 2000, 351). In the EU literature, a similar assumption states that the CJEU 
profoundly limits the EU Member States to correct and control for welfare migration, which is 
likely to have negative consequences for the welfare state .  
 
However, one critique of the welfare migration scenario is that it ignores domestic immigration 
policies and thus that immigrants too are restricted in their choices (Giuletti and Wahba 2012). In 
addition, we argue that theoretical and public assumptions on welfare migration insufficiently 
consider the capacities of welfare states to respond to and correct for welfare-induced behavior – 
through domestic political, but also administrative and judicial responses.  
 
At first glance, EU rules on free movement and cross-border welfare should allow for welfare-
motivated behavior. All workers, self-employed as well as EU citizens who can provide for 
themselves and their family members have a right to move and reside across the Union. In addition, 
they become eligible for welfare benefits in a hosting state under certain conditions. Regulation 
883/2004 details the rules establishing the right of European citizens to cross-border welfare, 
including which benefits can be exported to other Member States. Regulation 492/2011 establishes 
that migrant workers and national citizens have equal rights to the social advantages of the hosting 
Member State in which they work. Finally, Residence Directive 2004/38 defines the link between 
the right to reside and access to welfare benefits for the European migrant and states that after five 
years of residence, an EU citizen has the right to equal access to welfare. Before five years of 
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residence, s/he may have a right to social assistance but not to study grants, unless s/he has status as 
worker, is self-employed or is the family member of a worker (see article 24 (2) of Residence 
Directive 2004/38). However, EU citizens must not be an unreasonable burden to the social 
assistance system of a hosting Member State (see article 7 (1) (b) of the directive).  
 
The CJEU has played an important role in extending EU citizens’ rights to equal treatment in a host 
Member State. With the Sala case in 1998 (C-85/96), the Court established a judicial vision of 
Union citizenship as a fundamental status of Member State nationals (Dougan 2013, 133). The 
vision was further developed and extended in the Grzelczyk and Baumbast (C-413/99) cases, among 
others. These cases granted Union citizens the right of residence and equal treatment, as well as 
access to the welfare schemes of the hosting Member State despite being economically inactive. 
The Court stated that if a certain link has been established between the citizen and a host Member 
State, such a link could justify the right to equal treatment, i.e. before five years of residence. Thus 
jurisprudence allowed for a more immediate access to the welfare benefits of a hosting Member 
State.   
  
In addition, the Court has also developed an inclusive concept of who is a worker according to EU 
law. In the case of Kempf (C-139/85), the CJEU established that working 12 hours per week would 
suffice, and in the case of Megner and Scheffel (C-444/93), it ruled that 10 hours of work per week 
did not exclude a person from being regarded as a worker. In Ninni-Orasche (C-413/01), the CJEU 
stated that a fixed-term contract for ten weeks was sufficient to be a worker under EU law. 
According to Regulation 492/2011, workers have right to all social advantages in a hosting Member 
States. Those who are workers therefore also have rights to non-contributory benefits such as social 
assistance and study-grant. In the preliminary reference from the Danish Board of Appeal in 2013, 
LN vs Styrelsen (C-46/12),
1
 the CJEU laid down that a student who is also a worker according to 
EU law has a right to Danish study grant. Thus those EU citizens acquiring worker status remain 
more equal than others.  
 
However, at the same time, the expansive judicial interpretations have not been codified into 
secondary legislation by the EU legislature. Regulation 492/2011 does not confirm that in line with 
the jurisprudence of the Court, 10-12 hours a week for at least 10 weeks are sufficient to be 
considered a worker under EU law. In the absence of legislative codification, the status of ‘worker’ 
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under EU law remains, however, under-specified (Martinsen 2015). This allows for considerable 
variation in national implementation, where Member States “have exercised, and stretched, their 
considerable discretion on undefined terms” (O'Brien, Spaventa, and De Corninck 2016, 11). 
Comparing the domestic implementation of who is deemed a worker under EU law, a recent report 
notes that:  
“on the one hand the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is wavering; on the other hand, 
national authorities are giving a very restrictive interpretation of the guidance long established by the CJEU on who 
should be defined as a worker” (O'Brien, Spaventa, and De Corninck 2016, 14).  
 
Moreover, legal integration has not stayed on an even keel. From 2008 onwards, the Court appears 
to have embarked on a more restrictive course regarding the rights to social benefits of the 
economically inactive EU citizens. It has turned away from granting rights on basis of the Treaty’s 
provision on European citizenship and started to pay more attention to the words of the EU 
legislature, as stated in its secondary legislation. In the Förster (C-158/07) case, the Court examined 
the more restrictive formulations of the secondary law, as contained in Residence Directive 
2004/38, derogating from the general right to equal treatment of Union citizens (Dougan 2013: 
140). The more restrictive judicial approach has become even more notable in the recent case-law 
of Dano (C-333/13), Alimanovic (C-67/14), García-Nieto (C-299/14) as well as the Commission vs 
UK (C-308/14). More recent jurisprudence suggests that the Court increasingly pays attention to  
the more strict formulation of EU secondary law rather than the constitutional status of European 
citizenship as formulated in the Treaty (for such interplay between the CJEU and the EU 
legislatures, see Verschueren 2012, 2015; Dougan 2013; Hatzopoulos and Hervey 2013; Martinsen 
2015).  
  
This is the background against which Member States take over when applying EU rules and rights 
onto the national level. Neither the EU legislature nor the judiciary have specified how to do so, and 
Member States are left with certain discretion on how to apply these rather open and sometimes 
under-specified concepts. Domestic responses thus embark on a new round of filling the gaps of 
somewhat unclear rules and rights. Implementation and judicial impact litterature suggests three 
types of domestic responses as relevant in order to understand and explain the impact of dynamics 
rules and rights; judicial, political and administrative responses. 
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Judicial responses concern the ways in which national courts make use of CJEU decisions and EU 
law in national legal proceedings and the extent to which they make preliminary references to the 
CJEU to clarify points of national and EU law. A key assumption is that national courts have been 
increasingly socialised into accepting CJEU decisions and will integrate these into domestic 
jurisprudence (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009, 615; Alter 2001). However, other scholars note that 
national courts are often reluctant to act as decentral enforcers of EU law (Slepcevic 2009; Börzel 
2006; Davies 2012; Conant 2002; Wind 2009). Thus, the extent to which national courts act as 
decentral enforcers of EU law should be subject to empirical testing. 
 
Political responses concern the ways in which national politicians react to changes in EU rules. 
When political or judicial changes occur at the supranational level, national politicians have certain 
room of manoeuvre when deciding how to implement these rules. EU rules often leave room for 
discretion in terms of how to comply (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Versluis 2007; Conant 2002; 
Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2016). How politicians react within this manoeuvrable space and the 
extent to which they adhere to EU law is a conditioning factor on outcomes (Steunenberg and 
Toshkov 2009; Conant 2002). Consequently, domestic politics is a factor that should be considered 
when studying the implementation of EU rules.  
 
Finally, administrative responses concern the ways in which civil servants process EU rules, as 
adopted in national laws, decrees, instructions or domestic court cases, onto the target group. The 
target group in our case are EU citizens applying for social benefits. Implementation research 
reveals that civil servants’ behaviour, capacity and attention are crucial to policy outputs and 
outcomes, as they make ‘important discretionary decisions’ about the implementation of a policy 
for the target group (Winter 2012, 260). When processing EU rules all the way to concrete welfare 
outcomes, the behaviour and decisions of the local administration and the street-level bureaucrat 
also come into play (Lipsky 1980; Winter 2012; Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2016). The 
dispositions of local and street-level bureaucrats may also be influenced by judicial and political 
responses. The adherence of national courts to EU law becomes important in this regard (Conant 
2002). If an issue is assigned high political salience, administrative actors are found to pay more 
attention (Winter 2012; Versluis 2007). Furthermore, the clarity of rules and rights may become 
important for their implementation and outcomes. Finally, supervision, clearly communicated goals 
and expectations may diminish divergence in between political objectives and implementation.       
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Thus, insights from the literature on EU implementation and judical impact form an additional 
critique to the welfare migration hypothesis, suggesting that domestic responses may condition the 
outcomes of EU rules. Domestic responses may take different directions, underpinning or hindering 
the effective implementation of EU law. We now turn to the ways in which Danish actors 
responded to the dynamic rules of EU cross border welfare, in order to account for the outcomes 
which will be examined in the subsequent section.  
 
Domestic Reponses 
To cover the domestic judicial responses, we searched in national legal databases for national court 
cases concerning EU citizens and the benefits analysed in our study. Secondly, we searched for 
principle administrative rulings on this issue. Principle administrative rulings are quasi-judicial 
proceedings decided by the Danish Board of Appeal. These administrative rulings are deemed to be 
of more principled character and thus guide caseworkers in their future decisions (National Board of 
Appeal 2014). Therefore, they play a crucial role in defining future administrative practice. By 
including these quasi-judicial proceedings in our analysis, we could identify whether a former 
administrative decision was reversed by the appeal system, ultimately granting the benefit.  
 
Judicial considerations of EU law in Danish courts proved to be none for the benefits examined 
within the studied period. We found no court cases on EU citizens’ access to the selected benefits. 
This can partly be explained by the fact that Denmark does not have social courts (Martinsen 2005). 
Social policy cases are instead handled within the administrative recourse system. From January 
2002 until June 2017, we identified a total of 26 relevant principle rulings on the subject matter. 
None of these concerned child benefits or unemployment benefits. Seven of the principle rulings 
were on social assistance, whereas the bulk – nineteen rulings – concerned study grants. Of the 
seven principle rulings on social assistance, four granted the benefit (decisions no. 27-07, 180-09, 
190-11, 38-12). The principle rulings on study grants reflect a more restrictive judicial response. 
They were all made after the CJEU ruling in LN vs Styrelsen from February 2013, and their 
relatively high number – nineteen – reflects the assessed need to define the new administrative 
practice (interview, civil servant, May 2016). Only two of these granted the benefit (decisions no. 
10426, 10423), and the rest provided specifications defining when to reject study grants to EU 
nationals (decisions no. 9504, 9313*, 9928, 9544*, 9429*, 10425, 9851, 9850, 9484*, 9340*, 9295, 
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10424, 9849*, 9847*, 9391, 9390*, 9295).
2
 Taking the large majority of refusing rulings together 
helps to form a clear interpretation of the concept of worker (interview, civil servant, May 2016). 
The prime factor in defining a worker based on these cases is the number of hours worked per week 
(interview, civil servant, May 2016 and Danish Agency for Higher Education 2016). Approximately 
10-12 hours constitutes the threshold. However, other factors are considered too, including hourly 
wage, earnings, the duration of employment, etc.  
 
Turning to political and administrative responses, we see that these have become more restrictive 
over time. When negotiating the budget act in Autumn 2010, the Danish People’s Party (DPP) 
demanded that in order to support the budget proposal of the then liberal-conservative government, 
restrictions on EU citizens’ right to child benefits should be adopted. The issue became high politics 
and the government initiated a reform process, where a two-year residence clause for EU citizens to 
be entitled to full Danish family benefits was adopted with effect from 1 January 2012. This de 
facto discrimination did, however, not continue for long. In July 2012, a German worker in 
Denmark complained about his unequal right to Danish child benefits to the European Commission 
and the issue was examined as an EU pilot case. The Danish government decided to comply and 
from June 2013, the Ministry of Taxation announced that the residence clause would be waivered 
for EU citizens. The discriminatory practice thus lasted less than two years. The legislative attempt 
to restrict access to Danish child benefits had been unsuccessful and the Danish government now 
instead works for an EU legislative change of EU Regulation 883/2004 with indexation of child 
benefits as the main priority (Interview, civil servant, May 2016).  
In terms of unemployment benefits, a key issue in Danish politics has been that EU rules allows an 
EU citizen to aggregate insurance periods from other Member States and thus be entitled to Danish 
unemployment benefits more immediately without fulfilling the Danish criteria of having paid 
contributions to a Danish fund for at least one year. To hinder immediate access, Danish law 
requires that EU citizens have worked for at least three months in Denmark before being able to use 
the EU principle of aggregation. Finland has similar rules, but only requiring four weeks of work in 
Finland before the principle of aggregation applies. However, the EU Commission initiated an 
infringement procedure against Finland and former social affairs commissioner Laszlo Andor 
indicated that the Danish conditions were next on the list of inquiry (Politiken, ‘Dagpenge kan blive 
det næste EU slagsmål’, 1. Marts 2014). Denmark expressed its political concerns loudly to the 
Commission and apparently these have been heard. The Finnish case has not been taken forward by 
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the Commission and in the Commission’s proposal for reforming regulation 883/2004, it is 
specified that a three months work requirement, before the principle of aggregation applies, is in 
line with EU law (see COM (2016) 815). This demonstrates that the Commission at times takes 
political concerns into account and changes position accordingly.  
 
Administrative responses in the Danish municipalities ultimately decide on EU citizens’ entitlement 
to social assistance. To be eligible to social assistance, one must be a legal resident with no other 
means to support oneself. Social assistance is subject to activation measures. If in doubt, the 
municipalities can request the State Administration to determine a person’s right to reside on the 
basis of having applied for or received social assistance. The State Administration thus decides on 
whether the EU citizen is an ‘unreasonable burden’ to the social assistance system (interview, 
September 2015). While the municipalities have found EU rules to be unclear for years, greater 
clarity on the eligibility of EU citizens has gradually been established for social assistance and 
whether one’s social assistance affects one’s right to reside (interview, March 2017). The State 
Administration as well as the quasi-judicial decisions of the National Board of Appeal will inform 
municipalities how to administer rather open and unclear EU rules. The administrative practice in 
the municipalities appears to have become more restrictive (interviews, March 2017). According to 
the State Administration, more municipalities now refuse applications for social assistance, and few 
EU citizens appeal such decisions (interview, September 2015). That the need for social assistance 
may negatively affect the applicant’s right to reside has also become increasingly clear (interview, 
ibid). The local case-worker has access to data and information on an EU citizen’s worker status, 
estate and on family members’ personal situation. In this way, the caseworker can exert 
considerable administrative control on the worker status of an applicant. A more coherent but also 
restrictive administrative practice has developed over the years in which the entitlement to social 
assistance and how it conditions the right to reside depends on both the worker and residence status 
of EU citizens.  
 
The expanded access to the Danish study grants triggered by the CJEU ruling LN vs Styrelsen in 
February 2013 was subsequently limited by enhanced control mechanisms (interview, May 2016). 
The ruling first triggered a political reaction that again resulted in an administrative response. The 
Danish government declared that Denmark would comply with this new ruling and established a 
broad political agreement (Agency for the Danish students' Grants and Loans Scheme 2013). 
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According to the agreement, the costs of complying with the ruling could not exceed 390 million 
DKK (app. 52 million euro), the equivalent of granting approximately 5500 EU citizens study grant 
on basis of their status as a worker. If the effects of compliance exceeded this amount, the parties 
were obliged to adopt ‘safeguards’.3 The agreement also ordered the Ministry of Higher Education 
and Science to follow the development and report back to the parties. Finally, it was agreed that 
more control over the worker status of students should be exercised. Thus, the responsible agency 
introduced an automatic search every three months among all EU citizens receiving study grants to 
determine whether either the number of hours they worked or their salary has decreased. If so, their 
cases were to be assessed individually (interview, May 2016).  
 
These enhanced control mechanisms have resulted in over 1600 cases in which EU citizens have 
been asked to repay their study grants (Ministry for Higher Education and Science, May 2016). At 
the same time, the number of EU citizens receiving study grants as a result of the CJEU case has 
risen from 1345 students in 2013 to 4484 students in 2015. The costs of the study grants paid to EU 
workers amounts to 319 million DKK, which is still below the 390 million DKK mark that was 
established as the ceiling in the agreement of 2013 (Ibid.). In fact, 319 million DKK accounts for a 
rather modest 1.5% of the total Danish study grant costs of 21.5 billion DKK.  
 
In sum, the domestic reponses in Denmark to EU rules and the CJEU’s interpretations hereof have 
generally been restrictive. No domestic court case has pushed for EU citizens’ access to Danish 
welfare and principle administrative rulings have followed a restrictive course of interpretation. 
Domestic politics pushed for legislative changes that would limit EU citizens’ immediate 
entitlement to Danish child benefits. This attempt was, however, not successful. More successful 
was the maintenance of the Danish work clause before the principle of aggregation applies for 
unemployment benefits. Furthermore, administrative responses have become more restrictive over 
time, exerting more control for EU citizens’ entitlement to welfare benefits, by again controlling for 
the status as worker for the EU citizen as well as his/her right to reside.  
 
Outcomes  
We now turn to examining how outcomes have developed alongside the extension of cross-border 
welfare rights. Between 2002 and 2013, the number of EU citizens residing in Denmark rose 
significantly from 53,782 to 159,857 people.
4
 By the end of 2013, the five main states of origin for 
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EU citizens in Denmark were Poland, Romania, Sweden, Germany and the UK. Only EU citizens 
between 16-64 years old will be eligible for the four welfare benefits examined and below we 
measure the proportion of eligible EU citizens granted a benefit, i.e. as a relativ measure among the 
16-64 years old. In 2002, 43,898 EU citizens between 16-64 years old resided in Denmark. In 2013, 
133,052 16-64 years old EU citizens resided in Denmark. Figure 1 reports graphically the EU 
population in Denmark in total and the 16-64 years old eligible group between 2002-2013. In the 12 
years time span we see a considerable increase in residing EU citizens in Denmark, mainly 
explained by EU enlargement leading to more residents from the new member states (Martinsen and 
Pons Rotger 2017).  
 
Figure 1: EU citizens residing in Denmark in total and as 16-64 years old 2002-2013 
 
 
However, despite the significant increase of EU citizens in Denmark, as well as the extended rights 
to free movement and cross-border welfare, we find no corresponding increase in the proportion of 
eligible EU citizens receiving the four welfare benefits.  
 
Figure 2 below depicts the proportion of eligible EU citizens, i.e. EU citizens between 16-64 years 
old, receiving one of the four welfare benefits. Table 1 presents the absolute numbers for welfare 
recepients in 2002 and 2013. It should be noted that for study grants, child benefits and 
unemployment benefits, the benefit counts as granted disregarding for how many months it has 
been received, i.e. the compilation gives equal weigth to a benefit granted just once during that year 
as to a benefit granted for the full year. For social assistance, the compilation is EU citizens 
receiving the benefits as their main source of income at least 26 weeks a year.   
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For study grants, we see that the proportion of EU citizens receiving this benefit decreased between 
2003 and 2008 and then gradually increased within the period examined. In 2013, when the CJEU 
issued its ruling, the increase is more considerable than in previous years. We see that the 
percentage of EU citizens receiving the benefit hardly increased between 2002 and 2013. In 2002 
6.43 percent of the eligible received study grant against 6.56 percent at the end of 2013. For all the 
other benefits we see that the share of eligible EU citizens receiving the benefit dropped between 
2002 and 2013. For child benefits, the proportion of EU recipients is much higher than for the other 
benefits, being granted to both persons in and out-of-work. The percentages among 16-64 receiving 
the benefits decreases considerably between 2002 and 2013. In 2002, 24.8 percent of eligible EU 
citizens received child benefits in Denmark against 17.75 percent in 2013. The proportion of EU 
citizens with child benefits drops despite the failed political attempt to restrict access to the benefit. 
This finding indicates that a smaller proportion of EU citizens residing in Denmark in 2013 have 
dependent children than in 2002. For social assistance, we see that the percentage of EU citizens 
receiving benefits was twice as high in 2002 as in 2013. This percentage decreased significantly 
prior to 2008, followed by a modest increase. In 2002, 6.61 percent of EU citizens in Denmark 
between 16 and 64 years old received social assistance at least 26 weeks a year. At the end of 2013, 
only 3.18 percent of eligible EU citizens did so. Finally for unemployment benefits, we also see a 
decrease in the relative granting of the benefits to EU citizens. 5.34 percent of the eligible EU 
citizens received the benefit in 2002 against 4.64 percent in 2013. We see that the proportion of EU 
citizens granted this benefit during the 12 years time period undergoes more change than for the 
other benefits. We see the same significant decrease prior to 2008 as with social assistance followed 
by an increase after 2008. This finding suggests that for both social assistance and unemployment 
benefits, the economic crisis impacts on the proportion of EU citizens in need of support.      
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Figure 2: Proportion of EU citizens receiving welfare benefits among 16-64 years old in DK 2002-2013 
  
  
 
  
Table 1: EU recipients in DK in absolute numbers and as percentages of those eligible  
Recipients    2002 % eligible 2013 % eligible  
 Study grants 2,827 6,43 8,732 6.56  
 Child benefits 10,887 24,8 23,613 17,75  
 Social assistance 2,900 6.61 4,229 3.18  
 
Unemployment 
benefits 2,346 5,34 6,172 4,64  
 
Furthermore we examined the proportions of welfare beneficiaries among EU citizens 
disaggregated by the duration of their residence in Denmark on December 31
st
 of the year of 
measurement. As shown in Figure 3, the largest portion of EU citizens receiving benefits are long-
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term residents, i.e., individuals who have resided in Denmark for more than five years and therefore 
are entitled to equal treatment according to Directive 2004/38. This accounts for all four benefits. 
Assessed by years of residence, we see that de facto, a rather strong link is established between EU 
citizens and Denmark as a host state before a benefit is received. The more immediate access to 
benefits is not supported by our findings. For social assistance, child benefits and unemployment 
benefits, our findings demonstrate that throughout the 12 years time span, more than 60 percent of 
the EU citizens receiving one of the benefits have resided at least 5 years in Denmark, during which 
they have been subjected to tax payment and, in the case of unemployment benefit, subjected to 
contribution payment. For study grants, we see that apart from 2013 more than 50 percent of EU 
citizens receiving the benefit had resided in Denmark for at least 5 years. Hence, in accordance with 
Directive 2004/38, they enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of the hosting Member State. This 
finding on study grant thus supports the results on the other benefits: a rather strong link between 
recipient and host state is established before the benefit is received, albeit to slightly less degree.  
 
Figure 3: Proportion of EU citizens receiving welfare benefits among 16-64 years old, by years since residence, 
2002-2013  
 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Study grant 
AT MOST 1 YSM BETWEEN 1-2 YEARS
BETWEEN 2-5 YEARS AT LEAST 5 YEARS
18 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Child benefit 
AT MOST 1 YSM BETWEEN 1-2 YEARS
BETWEEN 2-5 YEARS AT LEAST 5 YEARS
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Social assistance 
AT MOST 1 YSM BETWEEN 1-2 YEARS
BETWEEN 2-5 YEARS AT LEAST 5 YEARS
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Unemployment benefit 
AT MOST 1 YSM BETWEEN 1-2 YEARS
BETWEEN 2-5 YEARS AT LEAST 5 YEARS
19 
 
 
Table 2: EU citizens receiving welfare benefits in absolute numbers and as percentages, by years since residence  
  Length of stay 2002 %  2013 %   
Study grant At most 1 year 104 3.69 675 7.74  
 1-2 years 131 4.64 1,073 12.29  
 2-5 years 920 32.52 2,690 30.81  
 At least 5 years 1,672 59.14 4,294 49.16  
 Total 2,827 100 8732 100  
Child benefit At most 1 year 395 3.6 1,210 5.1  
 1-2 years 441 4.05 1,355 5.74  
 2-5 years 1,461 13.42 3,721 15.76  
 At least 5 years 8,590 78.9 17,327 73.38  
 Total 10,887 100 23,613 100  
Social 
assistance 
At most 1 year 53 1.83 33 0.78  
 1-2 years 229 7.9 177 4.19  
 2-5 years 576 19.86 932 22.04  
 At least 5 years 2,042 70.42 3,087 73.0  
 Total 2,900 100 4,229 100  
Unemployment 
benefit 
At most 1 year 26 1.11 67 1.09  
 1-2 years 60 2.56 242 3.92  
 2-5 years 287 12.23 2,000 32.41  
 At least 5 years 1,973 84.1 3,863 62.59  
 Total 2,346 100 6,172 100  
 
Table 2 above provides the absolute numbers and the percentage granted the four benefits according 
to duration of residence. We can hereby compare 2002 with 2013. The overall, general picture is 
that the large majority of EU citizens receiving one of the four benefits are long-term residents. In 
sum, our analysis on outcomes does not support the assumption on welfare migration. During the 12 
years of notable change, EU citizens have not increasingly nor more immidiatedly been granted 
Danish welfare benefits.   
 
Conclusion 
The relationship between free movement of people and the welfare state is an increasingly salient 
issue in the EU. Strong assumptions on welfare migration have sounded both in the public and 
scholarly debate, according to which EU immigrants cluster in states with attractive welfare 
schemes and pose a fundamental challenge to the welfare state. Brexit has substantiated that the 
need to examine  the nexus of EU migration and the welfare state is more than a theoretical call. 
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Currently, the empirical call is equally strong, as EU rules are contested, indeed also beyond Brexit 
(Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2016; Reenen 2016).  
In this paper, we asked the extent to which EU citizens have gained increasing and more immediate 
access to Danish welfare benefits, and if so why or why not. Our findings first of all did not find 
support for the welfare migration assumption, but instead demonstrated that EU citizens have not 
increasingly or more immidiatedly been granted Danish welfare benefits. Analysing the time span 
2002-2013, we demonstrated that neither grand enlargements nor an expansive reading of EU 
citizenship has changed that pattern. In fact, the percentages of eligible EU citizens receiving child 
benefits, social assistance and unemployment benefits were lower by the end of 2013 than in 2002. 
For study grant, we instead found a modest increase. Furthermore, our findings on outcomes clearly 
demonstrate that the large majority of EU citizens receiving Danish welfare benefits are longterm 
residents. The idea that EU citizens have become more immediate – and according to the welfare 
migration scenario undeserving – recipients of welfare does not find empirical support. Instead, our 
findings strongly suggest that EU citizens have earned their way into the system, having resided for 
years in the host Member State and there been subjected to the payment of taxes and contributions. 
Elsewhere, we confirm the positive fiscal impact of EU citizens on the Danish welfare budget 
(Martinsen and Pons Rotger 2017).     
Our findings suggest three main explanations why EU citizens have not gained increasing or more 
immediate access to welfare benefits. 1) EU citizens are not motivated by welfare as such. As  
findings elsewhere demonstrate, they are overrepresented in work-active age groups, suggesting 
that migration is foremost motivated by work (Martinsen and Pons Rotger 2017). 2) EU citizens 
apply  less frequently for benefits. They tend to be weak claimants in a foreign system without 
sufficient information about their rights or sufficient knowledge about the appeal system. They may 
also fear that claiming their social benefit rights impact on their right to reside. 3) Domestic 
responses are restrictive and over time national control of entitlement to these benefits has been 
tightened.  
Our analysis finds no support for the welfare magnet theory and its political discourse, which 
currently haunts Europe. The findings do not substantiate that a generous, tax-based welfare system 
should be decisive for the residential choice of an EU migrant. In addition, our analysis refuses the 
welfare magnetic assumption that if welfare motivated behaviour unfolds, state are incapable to 
respond to and control for the negative outcomes hereof. We showed that domestic responses to 
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dynamic supranational rules have to be taken into account. When rules and rights were extended at 
the EU level, a national process of filling out the details hereof followed. The discretionary scope 
and concepts left open at the Union level were narrowed down and clarified nationally. National 
courts have not acted as decentral enforcers of EU law. They have not been agents of social change 
and domestic judicial responses have not convincingly functioned as a leverage of European rights. 
Instead, the quasi-judicial administrative recourse system came to emphasise the limits of European 
law. Thus, over the last decade, it has become much clearer who qualifies for cross-border welfare – 
and who does not. Furthermore, our findings demonstrate that appealing one’s case has little 
likelihood of success. Local administration and caseworkers do not have to fear national court cases 
changing their administrative decisions. There were none for the examined benefits, and the 
administrative recourse system approved restrictive eligibility principles. Local administration and 
caseworkers have discretion and can exert considerable administrative control when deciding on EU 
citizens’ welfare rights. Both in judicial, political and administrative terms, national actors address 
rather open and unclear EU rules restrictively.  
In sum, the leeway created by EU rules and developments in constructing cross-border welfare met 
its limit in domestic responses. Extended EU rules and rights are responded to by tighter national 
administrative control. We have identified some institutional changes, but those changes are 
deliberately designed to restrict the outcomes of EU law. Equal treatment is applied to long term 
residents. The assumption that EU citizens become more immediate beneficiaries is not supported 
by our findings. This is in line with EU secondary legislation, whereas the CJEU interpretations 
suggesting equal treatment before five years of residence have so far had limited outcomes.  
Domestic responses generally proved to be restrictive, and when filling the gaps of unclear rules 
and litigation at the national level, welfare state’s borders are established anew through 
administrative procedures of control and eligibility tests. At these new borders of the welfare state 
sits the caseworker who has become increasingly familiarised with assessing the rights of EU 
citizens. The right to have rights is not an easy test to pass. After the extension of EU rights, 
national institutional safeguards, extended conditionality and control follow. Additionally, we see 
that the benefit recipient has normally established a rather solid, social link to the hosting state. That 
social link has typically been established through years of working in the host state. The right to 
reside is still firmly tied to being a worker or being able to provide for oneself. Our findings do not 
support that the link between obligations and rights have withered away due to EU rules and 
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litigation. In practice, it is still upheld. In researching a period of unprecedented change, our study 
of domestic responses and outcomes points to the welfare state as rather robust to EU migration.  
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1
 Case C-46/12, 21 February 2013, L. N. v Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og Uddannelsesstøtte. Preliminary 
ruling made by Ankenævnet for Statens Uddannelsesstøtte - Denmark 
2
 The asterisks indicate that the principle ruling does not concern the concept of worker as such but addresses related 
matters such as derivate rights as a family member of a Union worker. 
3
 See the agreement, ”Aftale om reform af SU-systemet og rammerne for studiegennemførelse” of 18 April 2013, p. 10.  
4
 These numbers refer to the 100 percent population of EU citizens residing in Denmark on the December 31st of each 
year between 2002 and 2013. Residing citizens from the new member states are not included before EU membership of 
their country of origin.   
